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1. Introduction 
 
The Italian Republic’s Constitution defines health as an “individual fun-
damental right” and as a “public interest”1. Hence the entitlement to health 
is not limited to the individual human being, but is also a public concern 
given the contribution of the individual to the development of the society 
he is a part of. This principle obliges the State to program all the activities 
required to guarantee the health of all citizens and entitles individuals to 
claim a subjective right to the protection of health not only as a personal 
good but also as a resource for society’s growth. This constitutional right 
inspired the foundation of a national health service in 1978 with the goal of 
providing uniform and comprehensive care, sharing the responsibility for 
healthcare between the State and the Regions. Thirty years after its institu-
tion and following several reforms the key principles of the Italian National 
Health Service are still in place. Although citizens show a certain degree of 
dissatisfaction with the service provided, they also express strong support 
for a universalist, egalitarian and publicly-funded healthcare system2.  
An important issue is to what extent the national health service meets the 
potential demand for health services, given the health needs of the popula-
tion. The individual, in a moment of extreme need, is ready to pay to pre-
  
∗ Università di Firenze, Firenze, Italy.  
1 Art. 32: “La Repubblica tutela la salute come fondamentale diritto dell’individuo e in-
teresse della collettività, e garantisce cure gratuite agli indigenti”. 
2 See the results of Eurobarometer in December 2007, where 63% of respondents 
thought that the quality of Italian hospitals was good and 75% thought the same for special-
ist and GP visits (EC, 2007).  
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serve his deteriorating health and improve his well-being: in such circums-
tance health is a good in an economic sense although, in comparison with 
other goods, it cannot be directly exchanged but only improved through 
“intermediate inputs” (health services). Health demand is typically rationed 
by some measure of cost such as co-payments or waiting lists. However, 
demand might be constrained by income-related variables if the public 
healthcare system does not meet the population’s health needs and patients 
are forced to turn to the private market with higher out-of-pocket payments. 
Does rationing in relation to the socio-economic status of the patient exist 
which might jeopardize the equity of access to a constitutional right? 
The Italian case has been investigated in some recent contributions fo-
cused on doctors’ visits (Fabbri and Monfardini, 2003; Atella et al., 2004; 
Fabbri and Monfardini, 2006; Atella and Deb, 2008). Fabbri and Monfardi-
ni (2003) use count models to investigate the relationship between individ-
ual characteristics and the demand – and intensity of use – of generic and 
specialist visits provided by public and private doctors. Atella et al. (2004) 
study the same issue with a focus on the role of income as a determinant of 
access to health care. They conclude that the uses of public and private care 
are driven by different processes and that income strongly influences the 
mix of services. Fabbri and Monfardini (2006) estimate a simultaneous eq-
uation model of doctors’ visits to measure effectiveness of user charges and 
administrative waiting time in curbing the demand for public physicians’ 
care in a market including private providers as an imperfect substitute. 
Atella and Deb (2008) investigate substitution and/or complementarities in 
the Italian mixed public-private system. They estimate that public and pri-
vate specialists are substitute and individuals would opt for care from pri-
vate specialists if either the cost of public specialists is sufficiently high or 
their quality sufficiently low. 
Indeed generic and specialist consultations represent a primary health-
care service however, as our analysis will show, diagnostic tests and hos-
pital services also deserve specific attention. In particular, the introduction 
of co-payments for diagnostic tests is under scrutiny as a policy tool for fi-
nancing public health expenditure deficits in some Regions. This prospect 
could have a differentiated impact on patients, depending on the determi-
nants of demand for this specific service and on the differences, if any, be-
tween public and private providers. In fact, a significant share of utilization 
of diagnostic tests is provided by private structures and a large part of this 
cost is also paid by the lower income portion of the population. 
This paper offers an empirical assessment of the determinants of health-
care demand in Italy for a detailed range of services. Our approach relies on 
the literature using two-part models to study healthcare demand (Mullahy, 
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1986; Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995). An econometric hurdle model is ap-
plied to study the demand for healthcare, providing insight into how rele-
vant socio-economic variables are in determining both the decision to con-
tact and how frequently to use a service, and the choice between public and 
the private providers. The empirical analysis is based on a large-scale sur-
vey conducted every five years by the Italian National Institute of Statistics 
which is representative of the population. The survey provides a full ac-
count of individual states of health, health care utilization, biometric pa-
rameters, socio-economic and other relevant variables. This dataset is 
matched with other microdata to generate information about the potential 
individual purchasing capacity and verify any income effects on healthcare 
demand. We distinguish between the public and the private providers of 
each healthcare service following the empirical literature mentioned above.  
The paper is set out as follows. The description of the structure of the 
Italian market of health services is presented in Section 2. In Section 3 the 
theoretical background is presented and the model used is described. A 
more consistent section of the paper (Section 4) is devoted to an analysis of 
quantitative and qualitative information revealed by our microdata: we be-
lieve that a preliminary descriptive analysis enables a meaningful choice 
both of the model and of the covariates used in the functions. Results of the 
empirical analysis are commented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 presents 
the conclusions. 
 
 
2. The Market for Health Care in Italy  
 
The Italian National Health Service (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale, SSN) 
was established in 1978 and became effective in 1980. In the last twenty 
years it underwent two main reforms 3 but its general principles were unaf-
fected and are represented by universalism (every Italian citizen is entitled 
to health care regardless of his/her fiscal capacity), comprehensiveness (a 
full range of health services must be provided), free access (health services 
are provided free of charge, except for some co-payments), equity (all citi-
  
3 The first reform was in 1992-1993 (Dlgs 502/1992 and 517/1993) when local health 
authorities became public enterprises while before they were a ruled by bodies elected by 
municipalities belonging to the area. Moreover, major hospitals became hospital enterprises 
and partial forms of competition and privatization were introduced. The second reform was 
in 1999 (Dlgs 229/1999) with the introduction of fiscal federalism, all residual transfers 
from the central state to Regions were abolished, each Region received more own tax re-
sources when the entire matter was reorganized and the system turned towards “planned 
competition”. For an analysis of the reform process of the National Health system see 
France et al. (2005). 
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zens have equal rights to health care in every part of the country). The SSN 
is characterised by organizational pluralism at three tiers of responsibilities: 
the national government, the Regions and the Local Health Enterprises 
(LHEs). The State is mainly responsible for establishing the institutional 
settings, planning, controlling, setting the budget and sharing it among Re-
gions and, as a last resort, financing and paying off the debts of Regions. 
Regions too are responsible for financing the system, for sharing resources 
among the LHEs, for controlling and appointing top managers of LHEs4. 
Finally LHEs are responsible for providing health services either within 
their own structures or through contracts with private accredited providers: 
consequently there is a public-private mix in providing SSN health ser-
vices. 
The Italian SSN is mainly financed by general taxation (97%)5, by pa-
tient co-payments and by borrowing. Depending on a citizen’s income, age 
and health condition, patient co-payments (tickets) are required for special-
ist consultations, drugs, outpatient treatments, specific diagnostic and labo-
ratory tests, and medical appliances6. However, primary care is provided 
free of charge by general practitioners (GPs). In general they can serve at 
the most 1,500 patients and are paid according to a capitation fee that ap-
plies to the number of people on their list. Moreover, they should act as 
gatekeepers for access to secondary services the provision of which is re-
funded by the SSN such as diagnostic tests, hospital admissions, specialist 
visits. People may choose any physician, among those under contract for 
the LHA they reside in, provided that the physician’s list has not reached 
the maximum of its capacity. The same organization is envisaged for pae-
diatric care provided by paediatricians working under a public contract and 
paid on a capitation basis.  
Specialized outpatient services, including visits and diagnostics and 
curative treatment, and hospitals are provided either by LHEs or by accred-
ited public and private facilities with which LHEs have agreements and 
contracts. People are allowed to access SSN specialist care only after ap-
proval by their GP, then the individual is free to choose any provider 
among those accredited by the SSN, even one outside his LHE. A co-
  
4 According to the 2004 data of the Italian Ministry of Health, there are 195 LHEs and 
96 Hospital Enterprises (see www.ministerosalute.it). 
5 Taxes are collected by central government and by the regions. 
6 Total exemption from user charges is guaranteed for citizens under 6 and over 65 years 
old if they have a household income below 36152 Euros. Social pensioners, minimum level 
pensioners, the unemployed with specific limits on income are also exempted (Law 724, 23 
December 1993, art. 1). Total exemption is also provided for individuals affected by chronic 
and disabling pathologies and by rare diseases. 
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payment is required as an additional source of financing for the provision 
of specialist outpatient care and as a way to moderate consumption. How-
ever, this fee is quite low compared to the average fees in the private sec-
tor7. Moreover SSN specialists can provide their services as private practi-
tioners within the public structures besides their schedule as employees if 
the National Health Service. This arrangement is the so-called “intra-
moenia” which represents a private practice using the SSN facilities: this 
service is fully charged to the patient because he can choose the doctor to 
visit exactly as in the private market.  
Indeed, the public health care system coexists with a private market for 
medical services. The public-private mix in the supply of health services 
varies considerably among Regions, on average approximately 40% of 
health services are supplied by private providers with a higher percentage 
in the South. In order to supply specialist care, private providers are subject 
to authorisation based on minimum standard requirements. Visits to private 
doctors do not require GP referral and expenditures are covered either by 
out-of-pocket payments by patients or by private health insurance. In gen-
eral fees for private health services are much higher than co-payments in 
public structures, but waiting times may be shorter and better quality may 
be perceived by patients though this is not always the case.  
Total household health expenditure therefore consists of various items 
which represent a share of 22 per cent of total health services effectively 
consumed by Italian households in the year 2006 8. It’s interesting to ob-
serve that this household share has been decreasing since the late Nineties 
when it reached 29 per cent. This evidence can partly be explained by Fig-
ure 1 where the major items of household health expenditure at constant 
prices are shown. The most important category is expenditure for medicines 
followed by dental visits, other generic and specialist consultations and di-
agnostic check-ups. Most of these health expenditures are decreasing in real 
terms while private expenditure for drugs decreased at the beginning of the 
  
7 In most Regions – except for Lombardia – the maximum co-payment required for spe-
cialist visits is 36.15 Euros while for diagnostic tests the limit is 51.65 Euros for each pre-
scription. Health services for early diagnosis of tumours are exempted from user charges as 
well as some services provided in special circumstances of social interest (vaccinations, 
motherhood protection, blood donation, victims of terrorist attacks).  
8 This share is computed as a ratio between the “household final consumption expendi-
ture” and the “effective household consumption expenditure” for health services as pub-
lished in the Italian National Accounts. As defined by ESA95, the first concept refers to this 
sector’s expenditure on consumption goods and services not to its acquisition, thus includ-
ing only co-payments and out-of-pocket payments for private care utilization and medicines. 
The second concept also includes health goods and services financed by the government or 
non-profit institutions but supplied to households as social transfers in kind.  
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years 2000, in part as a result of the abolition of patient co-payments for 
drugs, then increasing again after a few years when co-payments were re-
introduced in 11 of the 20 Italian regions.  
Summing up, the SSN covers most health services provided to Italian 
households although the relative importance of out-of-pocket payments dif-
fers when several categories of health services are considered as shown in 
section 4. 
 
Fig. 1 – Out-of-pocket household health expenditures: selected categories (1997-2005) 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on Italian Household Budgets (Istat). 
 
 
3. Conceptual framework 
 
Any empirical study on health care utilization must refer to the main 
theoretical approaches usually used to analyze individual demand for 
healthcare services. The first traditional approach was formulated by 
Grossman (1972) and labelled as the human capital model: health is both 
demanded and produced by consumers as the individual is the sole deci-
sion-maker in the process of health care utilization. Health is a source of 
utility and influences income and wealth levels. Individuals demand health 
both as a consumption commodity – sick days are a source of disutility – 
and as an investment commodity – an increase in the stock of health re-
duces the amount of time lost to market and non-market activities 
(Grossman, 2000). Typical health demand is thus negatively correlated with 
the price for medical services but it is also determined by the latent variable 
“health status”, the age variable, the individual wage rate, a time trend, a 
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vector of environmental effects and the level of education. The rate of de-
preciation for the health capital stock increases with ageing with a conse-
quent rise in the shadow price. The theory predicts a negative coefficient 
for education if more educated people are more efficient producers of 
health. A higher wage leads to a substitution of time for medical services, 
because time becomes relatively more expensive, increasing the opportu-
nity cost of sick time. One-step econometric models for count data (Poisson 
or Negative Binomial) have been used to estimate this theoretical paradigm 
but empirical analysis has usually produced results contrary to theoretical 
predictions9.  
A second approach to healthcare demand is to assume that the demand is 
made in two stages and not determined solely by the individual: in fact the 
patient is responsible for the decision to first contact the health care pro-
vider, but then the length and frequency of treatment is largely determined 
by the doctor. This approach is based upon the principal-agent framework 
where the patient (the principal) is not able to translate his needs into a de-
mand for a specific treatment so he explains his symptoms to a physician 
(the agent) who can use his professional knowledge to formulate the de-
mand for the appropriate treatment10. At this stage significant information 
asymmetry may give physicians the opportunity to influence demand not 
only according to medical criteria but also by reacting to economic incen-
tives (supplier induced demand)11. However, a different decision-making 
process for the contact and the frequency decision may be conditioned by 
other supply factors such as a long waiting time for accessing the service, 
the different quality offered by providers, a difference in the cost charged to 
  
 
 
9 See Wagstaff (1986), Cameron and Trivedi (1986). These studies along with many 
others are reviewed and commented on by Grossman (2000). 
10 In health economics asymmetric information and uncertainty are the main factors in-
fluencing physician behaviour. Sources of uncertainty are the following: 1) the classification 
of the patient in terms of disease condition; 2) uncertainty about the effects of treatment for 
a given condition; 3) patient preferences may not be known to the physician (McGuire 
(2000)). 
11 A review of the theory and empirical literature of physician agency is given by 
McGuire (2000). Physician–induced demand is “when the physician influences a patient’s 
demand for care against the physician’s interpretation of the best interest of the patient” (p. 
504). This demand inducement must be distinguished from useful agency: inducement is a 
prescription of care that a fully-informed consumer would not want to use. However supply 
may induce its own demand also where a third party practically guarantees reimbursement 
of usage. Empirical analysis usually shows that per-capita consumption of medical services 
is positively correlated with the physician/population density across areas as summarized by 
the Roemer law “a bed built is a bed filled”. 
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the patient: all these supply factors may constrain health care demand both 
at the contact stage and at the frequency of treatment stage12.  
Besides the theoretical connection with a two-step decision-making 
process, the appeal of the hurdle model is partly driven by an important fea-
ture of the demand for medical care, which is the high incidence of zero us-
age. For instance, approximately 72% of a cross-sectional sample of Italian 
individuals reports no outpatient visits in the year 200013.  
The hurdle model was originally presented by Cragg (1971) for use in 
expenditure models with excess zeros. This model assumes that the partici-
pation decision and the positive count are generated by separate probability 
processes (Jones, 2000; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Let an individual with 
fully observed outcome be a participant in healthcare demand. There are 
two variables of interest: a binary indicator d, with associated covariates x1 
and parameters β1, and a continuous variable y, with covariates x2 and pa-
rameters β2 where: 
 
y = 0 if and only if d = 0. 
 
Zero observations may have different meanings depending on the ob-
served variable14. In the case of healthcare services we assume that there is 
something special about zero observations, that is to say they are not simply 
the reflection of over-dispersion. Indeed, one possible explanation for ex-
cess zeros is additional, individual, heterogeneity beyond the differences 
that can be summarised by the observed explanatory variables. This could 
be dealt with by adding further heterogeneity and spreading out the distri-
bution of the count variable, meaning that more observations are shifted to 
the tails of the distribution so that we would expect to observe more zero 
values and more high values than would be predicted by the basic count 
model. The most commonly applied model that takes into account addi-
  
12 This two-stage modelling approach has been widely used in applied studies: the em-
pirical counterparts of this theoretical approach are the so-called hurdle models of the type 
proposed by Mullahy (1986) and used, among others, by Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995). The 
first part of this econometric model treats the contact decision as the result of a binary 
choice while the second stage treats the intensity of healthcare utilization as a truncated 
count model. 
13 A similar issue arises when considering continuous demand measures like expendi-
ture. However, zero expenditures in household healthcare consumption statistics may also 
arise because they record only out-of-pocket payments and user charges, thus effective de-
mand is underestimated. 
14 Extensive debate has been devoted in literature to the difference between consumption 
as a variable of interest and expenditure as the observed variable. For an example of model-
ling zero expenditures in household consumption see Bardazzi and Barnabani (1998). 
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tional unobservable heterogeneity is the negative binomial or negbin model 
which allows for overdispersion by assuming that the individual error term 
comes from a particular probability distribution (the gamma distribution). 
However, like the Poisson, the negbin model assumes that there is a single 
process underlying all of the observed values of the dependent variable, 
whether y equals 0 or is greater than 0. Instead, our interest lies in the type 
of factors that distinguish users and non-users of health care, in particular to 
verify whether socio-economic and supply variables determine access to 
health services or influence the choice between providers. Therefore, we 
use a hurdle model where the assumption that zeros and positives come 
from the same data-generating process is relaxed (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005). The zeros are determined by the density f1(. | θ1) so that Pr [y = 0 | 
X] = f1(0 | θ1). The positive counts come from the truncated density f2 (y | 
y>0 | X) = f2 (y | θ2 ) / (1 – f2 (0 | θ2), which is multiplied by Pr [y>0] = 1 – 
f1(0 | θ1) to ensure that probabilities sum to unity. In general f1 (. | θ1 ) is a 
Logit/Probit model while f2 (. | θ2 ) is a Poisson/Negbin model. Thus the 
observed data has density 
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Maximum likelihood estimation of the hurdle model involves separate 
maximization of the two terms in the likelihood, one for the zeros and the 
other for positives 15. 
The covariates of the two stages need not be the same although in prac-
tice they are often the same: if so, the interpretation of the explanatory vari-
ables may be different between the meaning of overcoming the hurdle (be-
ing a participant or not) and the frequency decision (how intense the de-
mand is, given that one is a participant). However in hurdle models 
overdispersion is a function of explanatory variables while in the negbin 
models zero observations are due to unobserved heterogeneity which is 
treated as a fixed parameter. All these reasons explain the appeal of two-
part models compared to one-step specifications. Nonetheless some draw-
backs of this approach must be mentioned: first of all it is not a parsimoni-
ous specification as the number of parameters is typically doubled and their 
interpretation is not as straightforward as in the same model without hur-
dles. Another limitation was pointed out by Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) 
  
15 See Jones (2000). 
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and was subsequently explored by Santos Silva and Windmeijer (2001). 
The hurdle model assumes a sharp dichotomy between users and non-users 
which may be appealing when modelling data on episodes of medical care 
but this distinction is only tenable if we assume that an individual’s visit to 
a physician corresponds to a single spell of illness during the period cov-
ered by the survey: this issue may be especially problematic with annual 
data and especially for primary care. Moreover, with no additional informa-
tion the first count in the observation period may be misclassified, because 
it may belong to an illness episode of the preceding period. A longer obser-
vation period may reduce the probability of misclassification at the expense 
of the other specification problem due to multiple illness spells as men-
tioned above. Deb and Trivedi (1997, 2002) introduce an alternative ap-
proach to model the unobservable heterogeneity among individuals, divid-
ing the population among frequent and infrequent health care users depend-
ing on their health status, attitudes to health risk, and choice of life-style. 
These characteristics can be captured by latent class models (LCM) which 
can distinguish between groups with high average demand and low average 
demand thus avoiding the sharp distinction implied by hurdle models and 
the problem of multiple illness spells16.  
In this paper we have chosen to adopt a double hurdle model for all 
health care service equations on the grounds that the distinction between a 
first contact and multiple contacts makes sense theoretically when one is 
focussing on income-related effects and that our data characteristics miti-
gate the problem of multiple spells of illness within the period surveyed. In 
our data setting the observation period is four weeks for all healthcare ser-
vices except hospital admissions, for which it is three months. Thus we be-
lieve that the time span is short enough to avoid the problem of multiple 
illness spells, although it is perhaps too short to assume that an illness spell 
is entirely covered by the interview period for the majority of patients so 
that a problem of misspecification for the second step of the process may 
arise17. 
  
16 This theoretical framework has been applied in several empirical works. Jimenez- 
Martin et al. (2002) find strong evidence that LCM is superior to the hurdle model for GP 
visits but not for specialists visits. They argue that over a period of 12 months, multiple 
spells of illness (treatment) are more likely for GP visits than for specialist care. The LCM 
theoretical framework is applied for the Italian case by Fabbri and Monfardini (2006) and 
Atella and Deb (2008). 
17 In a previous study (Bardazzi, 2007) a comparison between a negative binomial 
model and a two-part model was performed on generic and specialist consultations. Esti-
mates showed that although there are a number of difficulties in capturing the major deter-
minants of multiple visits ( such as the competition among doctors and the preferences for 
income and leisure of the physicians), there are significant differences between the two deci-
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4. Data and descriptive analysis 
 
Empirical studies of health care demand have taken place at the market 
and at the individual level. The first-generation studies were based on stan-
dard demand theory, sometimes building a model of both supply and de-
mand using macrodata in order to allow for international comparisons18. 
More recently, emphasis has been put on the use of individual level data 
and on microeconomic analysis and techniques, as microdata become in-
creasingly available in health economics.  
In this study we use the individual data collected by the Italian Statistical 
Institute within a system of Multipurpose surveys – “Indagini Multiscopo 
sulle Famiglie” – where every 5 years a special survey is devoted to the 
theme of health and utilization of health services (MS). The years covered 
by these data so far are 1994, 2000 and, the most recently distributed to the 
public, 2005. The survey provides a full account of individual health condi-
tions, health care utilization, biometric parameters, socio-economic and 
other relevant variables. The MS survey presents some useful characteris-
tics for our purposes: i) data are collected at the individual level: health and 
healthcare is mainly an individual matter as it depends on personal well-
being and perception; ii) the survey contains information on individual 
conditions of health and the utilization of medical services which is funda-
mental for estimating health care demand and not available from other 
sources with such a large sample19; iii) finally, information on waiting 
times for medical services is recorded and can be used to estimate a possi-
ble source of rationing on demand (Martin and Smith, 1999; Blundell and 
Windmeijer, 2000). However this dataset does not enable assessment of the 
relationship between income and medical care needs because neither in-
formation on income nor on total expenditure is collected. Therefore, a 
measure of “household purchasing capacity” is imputed performing a statis-
tical match with microdata from the Istat “Household Budgets Survey”20. 
  
sion processes – contact and frequency of use – which are lost in the negative binomial 
model and emphasized by the double hurdle model suggesting that this approach could give 
a more valuable insight into the estimation of health care demand. 
18 See various chapters in Culyer and Newhouse (2000) for examples of these models.  
19 The sample is representative both at the national and at the regional level. Sampling 
was based on a combination of stratification, multistage sampling and clustering. Stratifica-
tion was performed at the level of municipalities, clustering within the municipalities and 
the households. Information was collected through a face-to-face interview and the comple-
tion of an individual, written questionnaire. 
20 A possible alternative source is the survey conducted by the Bank of Italy as in Proto 
and Solipaca (2001) and in Atella et al. (2004). The reason for our choice lies in the fact that 
the definition of the survey unit is identical and that the Household Budgets survey could be 
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The matching procedure is performed according to the methodology de-
scribed by Inglese and Oropallo (2004) where the Household Budgets is the 
donor survey and the host survey is the MS, thus matching is at the house-
hold level and the imputed variable is total household expenditure21. This 
choice does not penalize our analysis because we believe that health ex-
penses are influenced by the family rather than the individual economic 
conditions. Following the application of the method to different sets of 
data, we have decided to use the survey of the year 2000 for which the sta-
tistical method has given better results with more than 90 per cent of exact 
matching over the total of cells22. 
This integrated dataset enables assessment of demand for the following 
items: visits to a general practitioner and to several specialists, diagnostic 
tests, hospital services, rehabilitation care, pharmaceutical products. In this 
study, we focus on generic and specialist visits23, on diagnostic tests24 – all 
measured as the utilization counts in the four weeks before the interview – 
and hospital services – the number of hospital admissions in the three 
months before the interview – to test if the population’s health requirements 
are met by the Italian health service and what the main determinants of 
health care demand are.  
 
 
4.1. Generic and specialist visits 
 
Table 1 shows the tabulations respectively for the number of visits to a 
general practitioner or a paediatrician (GP) and to a specialist (SP) in the 
four weeks before interview25. Zero counts are more than 80% for generic 
  
useful for further developments when moving from an analysis of count variables to expen-
ditures. 
21 Some common variables between the two surveys were selected and used for statisti-
cal matching (household size, age of household head (HH), education of HH, job status of 
HH, region of residence of HH, maximum education level within the household, kids under 
5 years old, older members of the household over 65). These variables were combined and a 
total of 864 cells identified to perform the matching.  
22 The MS survey used has been conducted from September 1999 to August 2000 when 
a sample of 52,300 households, comprising approximately 140,000 individuals, was inter-
viewed.  
23 Specialist visits in following sphere: paediatrics, geriatrics, cardiology, obstetrics-
gynaecology, ophthalmology, ear, nose and throat, orthopaedics, neurology, psychiatry, psy-
chology, urology, gastro-enterology, dietetics, dermatology. 
24 Type of diagnostic test: blood tests, urine tests, ultrasound, CAT scan, MRI, other ra-
diography tests, electrocardiogram, pap test, mammography, gastroscopy. 
25 Visits to a general practitioner and to a paediatrician share some characteristics: they 
are both provided mainly by the public health care system and are largely free of charge.  
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visits and even higher for specialists consultations26. We define our vari-
ables of interest by dividing both visits between those free of charge or with 
a co-payment (provided both by the public SSN and the accredited private 
providers) and those charged fully to the patient (provided either by private 
facilities or by SSN doctors, after their normal schedule within the public 
structures, as private professionals). We intend to verify if there are differ-
ent determinants for these two services which are distinguished mainly by 
their price, the waiting time and, sometimes, by the (perceived) quality of 
the service. For the sake of simplicity we have referred to the first group of 
services as public and to the second as private although the distinction by 
provider is not clear-cut, as we have explained above. 
In the case of generic visits, the use of an SSN general practitioner or 
paediatrician is largely prevailing (95%) and demand for fully-charged pri-
vate care is generally accounted for by paediatric visits for children up to 1 
year old. On the other hand, specialist visits with full payment are almost 
60% of the total with a certain variability across Regions. Most fully- 
charged visits are for dental care followed by gynaecological visits. In fact 
dental services are the weak spot in SSN coverage, where most care is pro-
vided privately and covered by out-of-pocket payments since few of the 
private health insurance policies cover this kind of expenditure. Therefore 
we have decided to exclude dental visits from our sample as they have dis-
tinctive characteristics of demand compared to other specialist visits. 
Data shows evidence of overdispersion as the sample variance is almost 
twice the mean in the case of generic visits and even more for private spe-
cialist consultations.  
From our data we may argue that the choice between public or private 
specialist visits appears to be driven more by a specific preference of the 
individual than by a state of necessity. Asked about the motivation behind 
the choice of the provider for their last visit27, almost 70 per cent of our 
sample answered that the fully-charged private specialist was chosen for a 
specific preference while one third of the sample felt constrained by neces-
sity. As shown in Table 2, the percentage of fully-charged visits within the 
public structures is small (3.2%) but with a larger share of individuals mo-
tivated by a state of necessity. This reason may be linked to a time con-
straint, to the quality of the service provided and to the health status of the 
patient. 
 
  
26 This survey data is representative of the population. Sample weights were then used in 
this work to evaluate the model for the Italian population. 
27 The question is framed as follows: “indicate the type of specialist and if out of choice 
or need”. 
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Tab. 1 – Tabulations of generic and specialist visits  
 GP visits Specialist visits 
    PUBLIC PRIVATE 
count Freq. % Cum. Freq. % Cum. Freq. % Cum. 
          
0 47,812,781 83.63 83.63 53,217,416 93.08 93.08 52,092,084 91.11 91.11
1 6,651,514 11.63 95.26 3,026,058 5.29 98.38 3,641,002 6.37 97.48
2 1,832,525 3.21 98.47 606,152 1.06 99.44 880,309 1.54 99.02
3 476,141 0.83 99.30 181,017 0.32 99.75 271,121 0.47 99.50
4 266,628 0.47 99.77 80,873 0.14 99.89 189,057 0.33 99.83
5+ 132,628 0.23 100.00 60,695 0.11 100.00 98,640 0.18 100.00
       
Total 57,172,217 100.00  57,172,217 100.00  57,172,217 100.00
   
Mean  0.238  0.095 0.133
Variance  0.432  0.182 0.279
Conditional 
mean*  1.457  1.362  1.308
* Average number of visits given once a contact has taken place. 
 
 
Tab. 2 – Reason of the last specialist visit by specialist type 
Specialist type Total* For preference** 
Accredited private  10.1 67.3 
Full charge private 52.8 69.7 
Public 33.4 67.2 
Full charge public 3.2 53.9 
Unknown 0.4 73.3 
Total 100 68.1
* For 100 persons who had a specialist visit. 
** For 100 persons who had a specialist visit with the same specialist type. 
 
 
4.2. Diagnostic tests and hospital services  
 
Diagnostic tests may be performed both by public structures and private 
providers. Data shows that the use of SSN and of accredited private ser-
vices is prevalent (81 per cent) over the fully-charged private providers. As 
for hospitals, 88 per cent of patients were admitted to a public structure 
while 11 per cent used an accredited private hospital and only 1 per cent of 
the patients chose to be admitted to a fully-charged private hospital. 
Table 3 presents the tabulation for the number of public and private tests 
(in the four weeks before the interview) and of public hospital admissions 
(in the three months before interview). As one can see zero counts are very 
large for both services and overdispersion is evident.  
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Tab. 3 – Tabulations of diagnostic tests and hospital admissions  
 Hospital admissions Diagnostic tests 
   PUBLIC PRIVATE
          
count Freq. % Cum. Freq. % Cum. Freq. % Cum. 
       
0 55,169,736 96.50 96.50 51,528,155 90.13 90.13 55,582,448 97.22 97.22
1 1,774,321 3.10 99.60 2,869,943 5.02 95.15 1,054,932 1.85 99.06
2 162,058 0.28 99.88 1,742,444 3.05 98.20 350,974 0.61 99.68
3 40,192 0.07 99.95 582,232 1.02 99.21 116,676 0.20 99.88
4 14,613 0.03 99.98 257,935 0.45 99.67 40,625 0.07 99.95
5+ 11,297 0.01 100.00 191,508 0.33 100.00 26,502 0.05 100.00
       
Total 57,172,217 100.00  57,172,217 100.00  57,172,217 100.00  
      
Mean         0.047 0.181 0.042   
Variance    0.076 0.449 0.091   
Conditional  
mean*       1.184                                     1.831                                   1.533 
* Average number of counts given once a contact has taken place. 
 
 
Another important characteristic of the demand for hospital care is the 
number of patients who decide to move out of their province of residence to 
be treated in a hospital: only 13 per cent of our sample was admitted to a 
structure outside their province or abroad with a larger share in Italy’s 
southern Regions. For the purposes of our research it’s important to under-
stand if this behaviour can be explained by a supply problem such as the 
availability of a hospital bed thus the demand is rationed or by other factors 
such as the quality of the hospital care. Some insights may be gained from 
our data: from answers to a survey question about the reason for a hospital 
admission outside the province of residence, we grouped the results into 
three different categories28: 
– SUPPLY_PROBLEM: the patient was forced to move outside the prov-
ince because of the unavailability either of a hospital or of an appropri-
ate unit for a specific health problem; 
– WAITING_LIST: the patient moved outside the province because of an 
unacceptably long waiting list; 
  
28 The detailed options listed for this question are: 1) there is no hospital in my province; 
2) there is no appropriate unit in the hospitals of my province; 3) I was not sure of the qual-
ity of the service; 4) I trusted more the structure I have chosen; 5) the waiting list was too 
long; 6) I followed somebody else’s advice. 
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– CHOICE: the patient’s decision was due to an individual preference for 
a specific structure at the suggestion of friends or relatives, low confi-
dence in the hospital within the province.  
As shown in Table 4, only 22 per cent of the sample declared migrating 
to a different province because of a supply restriction either due to hospital 
unavailability or to a long waiting list, while almost 80 per cent of patients 
decided upon a specific individual preference. However, this preference is 
also strictly connected with a supply factor: in fact on average 42 per cent 
of these patients admitted having moved to a hospital far from home be-
cause of their lack of confidence in the quality of care provided in the near-
est hospital. Finally there are clear-cut differences between Italian macroar-
eas: the “no-confidence motive” represents only 27 per cent of the 
CHOICE group of answers in Northern Italy while it rises to 56 per cent in 
the South.  
 
Tab. 4 – Factors explaining admission to a hospital outside the province of residence (%) 
 North West North East Center South ITALY 
SUPPLY_PROBLEM 11.7 18.7 24.9 18.6 18.1
WAITING_LIST 5.5 6.2 0.8 3.5 3.9 
CHOICE 82.8 75.2 74.3 74.6 77.9 
 
 
4.3. Waiting time, health care quality and economic status of patients 
 
Hospital waiting lists are not a relevant reason for migrating to another 
structure but waiting time is generally used as a tool for rationing public 
health care. From the consumer’s point of view, the existence of waiting 
times for health care makes time a sort of cost for these services. If there is an 
alternative to the public provider the consumer will decide to switch to the 
private provider if the additional cost of this service is compensated in terms 
of additional consumer surplus. Waiting times can be considered as a signal 
that health care demand is rationed29. Moreover if a (private) market for sub-
stitutes exists we may want to verify how many of these services are de-
manded because of the rationing operating in the public sector: this issue 
helps us to understand if the Italian SSN is in tune with the needs of the 
population in terms of health care. The MS survey provides information 
about the waiting time for obtaining the last visit, test and hospital admission 
as reported by patients who had at least one in the observed period. Table 5 
reports the average number of days waiting for each health care service. 
  
29 On this issue, see Martin and Smith (1999), Blundell and Windmeijer (2000). 
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Tab. 5 – Average number of days waiting for health care services in relation to Italian 
macro-regions  
Macro-
areas 
GP visits SP visits diagnostic tests ho-
spital 
 pu-
blic 
fully-
charged 
pu-
blic 
fully-
charged 
pu-
blic 
fully-
charged 
pu-
blic 
North-
West 
0.74 3.74 11.54 7.02 9.44 8.74 8.68 
North-East 0.73 5.66 17.5 8.76 12.47 10.75 11.21 
Centre 0.80 3.37 11.31 6.45 8.39 6.98 9.53 
South 0.78 1.87 7.15 4.9 4.68 4.12 5.7 
Islands 0.85 2.01 10.47 5.35 5.92 6.61 5.4 
        
Total 0.77 3.43 11.84 6.69 8.48 7.43 8.16 
 
For generic visits waiting times are negligible, while they are more sig-
nificant although limited in the case of other services. However a notable 
difference between the public and private specialist visits is worth mention-
ing: the number of days’ waiting between the decision to contact a special-
ist and the provision of the service is almost double in the SSN structures 
compared to private providers. A substantial variability across geographical 
areas is also observed: the North-East shows the highest waiting time, not 
only for specialist visits but also for other health services both public and 
private, while in the South the number of days waiting is about one-third 
below the average. This information needs to be interpreted with caution: 
the highest values for the North-Central Italian Regions could be read as a 
sign of inefficiency of the SSN in meeting the population’s healthcare 
needs but this is contradicted by the degree of consumer satisfaction with 
SSN services with the highest positive score observed in the Northern part 
of the country while in the South one quarter of the population is totally 
dissatisfied with the healthcare provided within the public system (see Istat, 
2007). Moreover to some extent a “congestion effect” may be assumed to 
be at work in Northern and Central Italy due to the migration of patients 
from areas of the country where the quality and the availability of health 
care is inadequate. Therefore, waiting times and waiting lists are only one 
element contributing to the quality of healthcare perceived by patients: in-
deed, demand has a propensity to concentrate where the quality of services 
is seen as superior and, for this reason, quite often in those areas waiting 
times are longer30.  
  
30 France et al. (2005) pointed out that dual practices (public and private) have encour-
aged doctors to run long waiting lists in their public practice to increase demand for their 
private practice. 
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Perceived quality of health care is also a key element in driving choice 
between public and private services: the main reason for selecting a given 
structure is the confidence the patient has in the provider, whether private 
or public, particularly for private (specialist) visits and hospital admissions 
but also for more than half of patients who preferred the fully charged di-
agnostic tests although in this case one-third of patients are willing to pay 
to avoid a long waiting time. This behaviour is particularly noticeable in the 
Southern regions for all healthcare services (Istat, 2007).  
Finally, one may wonder if access to private healthcare is conditioned by 
the economic household conditions. In our empirical analysis we estimate 
to what extent household income has a significant direct role in determining 
the demand for various types of treatments. Observed data reveals that al-
though poorer individuals have lower access to private services, the share 
of patients fully charged among them is fairly high (Table 6). If access to 
healthcare is significantly related to income then equity among socio-
economic groups may be jeopardized31: equitable health care utilization ex-
ists only when there is a correlation between health care provision and indi-
cators of need (equal treatment for equal need) but not with economic indi-
cators (payments according to ability to pay)32. 
This descriptive analysis raises questions concerning the founding prin-
ciples of universalism and equity of the Italian National Health Service: 
equal access for citizens living in the South and with poorer economic con-
ditions is apparently not fully guaranteed by the SSN which shows some 
difficulties in providing appropriate responses to individual needs. Equity 
in health care has two dimensions: social (inter-group) and geographic. 
Both aspects appear to be at risk in the Italian SSN but only the second has 
been tackled with several attempts to reduce the diversity of access among 
Regions, mainly in terms of the distribution of public healthcare facilities33.  
  
31 There is a huge amount of literature devoted so far to the issue of equity in health 
care. In Europe leading researchers on this topic have worked jointly in the ECuity project 
which has been partly funded by the European Commission. For a summary of results ob-
tained under this project see the July 2004 issue of Health Economics completely devoted to 
ECuity research. At the OECD level the issue of equity is studied by the OECD Health Eq-
uity Group. 
32 Van der Heyden et al. (2003) pointed out that differences in the rates of utilization of 
certain services by different socio-economic groups do not automatically reflect inequality: 
equal access relates to the opportunity to use the services needed rather than to the actual 
receipt of care (there might be some unnecessary treatments in higher income groups which 
one would not want to extend to other groups). 
33 In 2001 an agreement between the State and the Regions established the “essential 
level of care” (LEA, Livelli essenziali di assistenza) that should be guaranteed to every citi-
zen in the country. Basically it stated that all services currently provided are essential ex-
cluding dental care and other minor services (e.g. aesthetic surgery, physiotherapy, etc.). 
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Tab. 6 – Household economic resources and private health care services (2000) 
Self Assessed Evaluation of Household  
Economic Resources* 
Fully charged  
specialist visit 
Fully charged  
diagnostic test 
Very good 70.2 34.7 
Adequate  62.4 23.9 
Scarce  55.4 19.7 
Too low  51.2 17.3 
Total  60.5 22.8 
* For 100 individuals with the same economic resources who had at least one visit or one test. 
 
 
4.4. Variables description 
 
Our analysis of health care demand is based on a model specification 
which is essentially similar for all categories of services considered here, 
though there are some minor differences which will be explained hereafter. 
Our dependent variables – generic visits, specialist visits and diagnostic 
tests – are divided between “public” and “private” according to the share of 
cost charged to the patient as described above. As far as hospital services 
are concerned, our data can only estimate a model for public and accredited 
hospitals since the number of observations for private hospital admissions 
is very low.  
Andersen (1968, 1995) categorised the explanatory variables of the utili-
zation of health services into three useful groups: factors resulting in a pre-
disposition to use services – such as age, sex, and other demographic char-
acteristics –, variables that enable or impede utilization such as income, 
education, and health insurance and those that generate use i.e. need. In 
general, the demand for hospital services is mainly explained by need and 
demographics, since these services are demanded in severe health condi-
tions, while the demand for health services which are based on individual’s 
priorities are also explained by social and enabling factors.  
A full list of the explanatory variables used in our model along with 
their description is presented in Table 7. A first set consists of socio-
economic variables: besides individual demographic information, we used 
the imputed variable of total expenditure as a measure of household pur-
chasing capacity. A dummy for holding a private insurance should be 
relevant in estimating the demand for specialist visits as well as diagnos-
tic tests where co-payments are higher and the share covered by the pri-
vate sector is more significant. Then we have two groups of variables re-
flecting the individual’ short term health status and his health endow-
ments or stocks.  
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Tab. 7 – Variables description 
Dependent variables Description 
DVISITS  Number of consultations with a GP or a paediatrician in the past 4 weeks 
(public or fully charged) 
SVISITS  
 
Number of consultations with a specialist in the past 4 weeks (public or 
fully charged) 
DIAG. TEST Number of diagnostic tests in the past 4 weeks (public or fully charged) 
HOSPITAL Number of hospital admissions in the past 3 months (public provider) 
  
Explanatory variables  
-Socioeconomic  
MALE 1 if male 
AGE Age in years 
LTEXP ln(monthly family total expenditure) 
EDUC Education in years 
- insurance  
INSUR 1 if covered by private health insurance
- health status (short 
term) 
 
ACTDAYS Number of days of reduced activity in past four weeks due to illness or 
injury 
OUTWORKDAYS Number of days off work in past four weeks due to illness or injury 
- health status (long term)  
POOR_HEALTH 1 if self-perceived health is poor 
DAILYDIFF 1 if the person suffers from a condition that limits activities in daily life 
PHYS_LIM 1 if limitation of activity due to chronic illness 
SMOKE 1 if smoker or has smoked daily in the past 
- supply side   
PHYSDENS Number (per 10,000 inhabitants) of general practitioners and paediatri-
cians (regional) 
DOCDENS Number (per 10,000 inhabitants) of specialists in public and private insti-
tutes (regional) 
TEST_EQUIP  Quantity (per 100,000 inhabitants) of advanced equipments for tests (re-
gional)  
BEDS  Number (per 1000 inhabitants) of beds in public and accredited hospitals 
(regional) 
EXEMPT1 1 if exempted from diagnostic test co-payment for chronic illness
EXEMPT2 1 if exempted from diagnostic test co-payment for age, income or other 
- rationing  
WAIT_DVISITS Days waiting days for visits with a GP or a paediatrician 
WAIT_SVISITS Days waiting days for visits with a specialist doctor 
WAIT_DIAG. TEST Days waiting days for diagnostic test 
WAIT_HOSPITAL Days waiting days for hospital admittance (if booked) 
  
REFERENCE INDIVIDUAL: female, without private insurance, with no physical limitations or dis-
abilities, no smoking, in good health 
 
Finally, a separate treatment of the contact and the frequency decision, 
which could be potentially induced by the physician and could be influ-
enced by other supply factors, requires the inclusion of variables reflecting 
the consumption and leisure preferences of the doctor at the second stage of 
the estimation process. Unfortunately, the MS survey does not offer much 
information on the supply side factors of the health care system. Therefore, 
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we use some indicators from the “Health for all” database produced by the 
Italian Statistical Office – such as physician density – to proxy both the 
demand response (at the first level this variable may represent an availabil-
ity effect) and the supplier-induced-response (at the second stage it reflects 
competition among physicians). Obviously for each health service category 
we use the appropriate supply indicator such as the number of beds for hos-
pital care or the quantity of advanced technology equipment for diagnostic 
tests. More precisely, in the models we introduce as covariates the interac-
tions between these supply side indicators and the residential macroareas to 
capture the variance of resources and of geographical location. 
For diagnostic tests, we also use information about possible patient ex-
emption from co-payment either due to chronic illness, age or income. 
These variables are expected to be significant in influencing individual 
choice towards the public/accredited structures since the patient is com-
pletely exempted from any co-payment and could take advantage of this 
benefit by increasing the frequency of use.  
Finally, we exploit information on the waiting time to evaluate the rele-
vance of health demand rationing. As previously described, our data in-
cludes information about the waiting time for obtaining the last visit, test or 
hospital admission as reported by patients who had at least one in the pe-
riod surveyed. These figures were averaged across patients and standard-
ized at the macro-region level.  
 
 
5. Estimation Results 
 
In this study we apply a hurdle model – built around the assumption of two 
different processes respectively for the contact and the frequency decision – 
consisting in a logit specification for the first hurdle and a zero-truncated 
negative binomial for the second stage to estimate the demand for several 
healthcare services. Moreover, we aim at empirically verifying if a rationing 
effect is operating in the demand for several health care services. The results 
of this model are presented in Tables 8-14 where both steps are estimated for 
each healthcare service. A summary of results in terms of signs of the statis-
tically significant covariates is presented in Table 15. A first look at this 
summary table shows that the first stage model proves a better fit than the 
second one (respectively Panels A and B of the table). One reason is the sub-
stantial reduction in sample size for the frequency analysis. Another explana-
tion is that while in the dataset we find the most relevant variables to explain 
the contact decision, it is more difficult to capture the major determinants of 
multiple visits, such as the competition among doctors, and the preferences 
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for income and leisure of the physicians. Despite these shortcomings, the 
model highlights a number of issues concerning differences between the es-
timated parameters across the two stages. 
 
Tab. 8 – Demand for public generic visits  
Contact decision Frequency of treatment 
  Coef    Std Err      %(a)    Coef Std Err %(b) 
MALE  -0.093***  0.021 -8.9    0.011  0.041  1.1 
AGE 0.008*** 0.001 0.8   0.006***  0.001  0.6  
LTEXP -0.292*** 0.035 -25.4  -0.114  0.059  -10.8 
EDUC -0.062*** 0.003 -6.0 -0.043*** 0.005 -4.2 
INSUR  0.025 0.035 2.5 -0.186* 0.075 -16.9
ACTDAYS 0.057*** 0.002 5.8  0.028*** 0.003 2.9
OUTWORKDAYS 0.053*** 0.007 5.5   0.006 0.007 0.6 
POOR_HEALTH 0.510*** 0.040 66.5   0.420*** 0.052 52.1 
DAILYDIFF -0.213*** 0.064 -19.5  -0.065 0.080  -6.3 
PHYS_LIM 0.301*** 0.044 35.1   0.159* 0.065 17.3 
SMOKE 0.121***  -0.026 -11.4  -0.041 0.060 -4.1 
PHYSDENS_NWEST 0.009* 0.004 0.9  -0.012 0.008 -1.2 
PHYSDENS_NEAST 0.026*** 0.004 2.7  -0.022** 0.007 -2.2 
PHYSDENS_SOUTH -0.027*** 0.004 -2.7   0.023*** 0.006 2.4 
WAIT_DVISITS      0.002 0.007  0.2 
_cons  2.771*** 0.544    0.429 0.927  
       
N 140011    18381   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(a) percent change in odds for unit increase in X 
(b) percent change in expected count for unit increase in X 
 
 
5.1. Generic and Specialist Visits 
 
A distinction between generic and specialist visits is due to institutional 
reasons and this is partly confirmed by the difference in the sign of some 
variables for the respective equations of the first step. As estimated by other 
empirical studies, the variables income (total expenditure) and education 
have different impacts on the two visit types34. Individuals are more likely 
to seek care from private specialists – +24.5 per cent change in probability 
with all other variables constant – and less likely to consult public GPs and 
SPs as income increases (-25 per cent change in odds) while income is not 
  
34 This evidence was first estimated by Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) for Germany where 
the institutional setting is similar. Then, among others, for Italy by Fabbri and Monfardini 
(2003) and Atella et al. (2004), for Belgium by Van der Heyden et al. (2003) and for a set of 
European countries by Economou et al. (2007). On the issue of equity, Van Doorslaer, 
Koolman and Jones (2003) conclude that in Italy doctor access is high and equitable but 
while general practitioner access is pro-poor, specialist access is pro-rich. Giannoni (2008) 
confirms the evidence that there is no significant inequality in primary care utilization in 
Italy while there are inequities in access for specialist and diagnostic cares. 
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statistically significant in explaining the demand for private generic visits 
and public specialist consultations. This result may be explained by the op-
portunity cost of visiting a doctor: to seek care in the public sector costs 
more in terms of waiting-time (moreover to consult a public specialist re-
quires a visit to the GP as well). However, the household economic status 
does not affect the frequency of visits. 
 
Tab. 9 – Demand for private generic visits  
Contact decision Frequency of treatment 
  Coef Std Err %(a) Coef Std Err %(b) 
MALE  -0.005 0.076 -0.5 0.433 0.237 54.1 
AGE -0.022*** 0.002 -2.1 0.003 0.007 0.3 
LTEXP -0.095 0.151 -9.0 0.028 0.404 2.8 
EDUC -0.091*** 0.010 -8.7 -0.102** 0.038 -9.7 
INSUR 0.562*** 0.110 75.4  0.019 0.361 1.9 
ACTDAYS 0.046*** 0.006 4.7   0.033* 0.017 3.4 
OUTWORKDAYS 0.029* 0.014 2.9  0.016 0.027 1.6 
POOR_HEALTH 0.678*** 0.155 97.0  0.724 0.426 106.2 
DAILYDIFF 0.022 0.227 2.3  -0.688 0.668 -49.7 
PHYS_LIM 0.171 0.183 18.6  -0.150 0.467 -13.9 
SMOKE  -0.270* 0.113 -23.6  -0.087 0.397 -8.3 
PHYSDENS_NWEST  0.015 0.013 1.5  0.076* 0.038 7.9 
PHYSDENS_NEAST  -0.037** 0.014 -3.6  -0.022 0.045 -2.2 
PHYSDENS_SOUTH  -0.064*** 0.013 -6.2  0.030 0.039 3.1 
WAIT_DVISITS    -0.071** 0.026 -6.8 
_cons  -1.838 2.338   -11.408 6.318  
  
N 140011    1125   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(a) percent change in odds for unit increase in X 
(b) percent change in expected count for unit increase in X 
 
 
Education may correlate with medical knowledge, so that higher edu-
cated people tend to favour (public and private) specialists over general 
practitioners. Private insurance is not significant in determining visits to 
public GPs and SPs while it has a positive effect on other consultations 
where a full price is charged to the patient: being privately insured in-
creases the probability of visiting a private GP and SP with all other vari-
ables constant. This is a common result in applied literature that could be 
explained as the effect of an adverse selection process making frequent 
health service users look for supplementary coverage. Another interpreta-
tion could be represented by the moral hazard whereby there are incentives 
for the patient and the physician for over-treatment. This last explanation 
has to do with supplier-induced demand in a wide sense and there is no 
evidence of this effect in our findings, since holding a private insurance has 
no impact in the frequency equation which describes the outcome of the 
joint decision of the physician and the patient.  
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Tab. 10 – Demand for public specialist visits  
Contact decision Frequency of treatment 
  Coef Std Err %(a) Coef Std Err %(b) 
MALE  -0.140*** 0.032 -13.1  -0.015 0.073 1.5 
AGE 0.012*** 0.001 1.3 0.003 0.003 0.3
LTEXP  -0.097 0.051 -9.2 -0.247 0.115 -21.9
EDUC 0.012*** 0.004 1.2  0.004 0.009 0.4 
INSUR  0.023 0.051 2.3  -0.007 0.124 -0.7 
ACTDAYS 0.047*** 0.002 4.8 0.026*** 0.004 2.6 
OUTWORKDAYS 0.038*** 0.006 3.9 0.029*** 0.008 3.0 
POOR_HEALTH 0.699*** 0.055 101.2 0.498*** 0.088 64.6 
DAILYDIFF -0.538*** 0.084 -41.6  0.099 0.142 10.5 
PHYS_LIM 0.552*** 0.059 73.8 0.339*** 0.098 40.4 
SMOKE -0.064 0.038 -6.2  0.047 0.092 4.8 
DOCDENS_NWEST -0.004 0.003 -0.4  0.003 0.006 0.3 
DOCDENS_NEAST  0.002 0.003 0.2 0.012* 0.006 1.2 
DOCDENS_SOUTH -0.016*** 0.002 -1.6  0.002 0.006 0.2 
WAIT_SVISITS     -0.001 0.002 -0.1 
_cons  -1.967**  0.784   -6.590 1.903  
       
N 140011   8781   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(a) percent change in odds for unit increase in X 
(b) percent change in expected count for unit increase in X 
 
 
Being a smoker is significant in increasing the frequency of private special-
ists visits while non-smoking behaviour apparently determines a higher num-
ber of generic consultations. As for the other demographic characteristics, 
women appear to seek more medical care than men – mostly due to childbear-
ing – in line with the literature35. Individual age plays a significant role in both 
equations for public visits: the coefficient strictly increasing except in the case 
of private generic visits which are mainly paediatric consultations.  
It is not surprising that individuals who were ill (with days of reduced 
activity, out-of-work, in poor-health conditions) required more treatment 
both from general doctors and from specialists. Finally, the last set of vari-
ables aiming to proxy accessibility to medical services, was introduced to 
the model through interactions with the macroregion of residence. In fact, 
we tested that the geographic areas almost completely explain the variance 
of healthcare supply variables. Results show that the interactions between 
the Southern regions and physician (specialist) density are statistically sig-
nificant in decreasing the demand for generic (specialist) consultations 
compared to health resource provision in Central Italy.  
According to our results it appears that the frequency of visits depends 
mainly on a patient’s health status including being a smoker which in-
  
35 Among others, see Santos Silva and Windmeijer (1997), Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) 
and Winkelmann (2004). 
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creases the expected number of SP private visits. In particular, income, 
education and a private insurance do not affect frequency behaviour. This is 
consistent with previous findings for Italy based on different data36. Finally, 
the waiting time between the request and the effective day of the visit is 
never statistically significant thus the intensity of doctoral consultation de-
mand is not rationed by waiting time possibly because the public-private 
mix in the supply satisfies healthcare needs.  
 
Tab. 11 – Demand for private specialist visits 
Contact decision Frequency of treatment 
  Coef Std Err %(a) Coef Std Err %(b) 
MALE  -0.548*** 0.033 -42.2  -0.020 0.087 -2.0 
AGE -0.004*** 0.001 -.4  0.000 0.003 0.0 
LTEXP  0.117* 0.052 12.4  0.035 0.153 3.5 
EDUC 0.039*** 0.003 4.0  0.016 0.010 1.6 
INSUR 0.439*** 0.045 55.1  -0.036 0.123 -3.6 
ACTDAYS 0.046*** 0.002 4.7  0.019*** 0.005 2.0 
OUTWORKDAYS 0.043*** 0.006 4.4  0.041*** 0.012 4.1 
POOR_HEALTH 0.631*** 0.060 87.9  0.455*** 0.120 57.6 
DAILYDIFF -0.371*** 0.090 -31.0  0.076 0.243 7.8 
PHYS_LIM  0.483*** 0.063 62.1 0.331* 0.157 39.3
SMOKE  0.035* 0.037 3.6 0.314** 0.098 36.9
DOCDENS_NWEST  -0.012*** 0.003 -1.2  0.003 0.007 0.3 
DOCDENS_NEAST  -0.005* 0.003 -0.5  0.05 0.007 0.5 
DOCDENS_SOUTH -0.011*** 0.002 -1.1  0.009 0.006 0.9 
WAIT_SVISITS     -0.001 0.003 -0.1 
_cons  -4.965*** 0.810  -11.062*** 2.388  
       
N 140011    11722   
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(a) percent change in odds for unit increase in X 
(b) percent change in expected count for unit increase in X 
 
 
5.2. Diagnostic Tests 
 
The probability of a first contact for a diagnostic test is influenced by 
demographic variables, health status and the insurance variable in the same 
way as the specialist visits (Tables 12 and 13). However a special role is 
performed by the educational level of the patient which shows a strong 
positive effect on the demand for tests at both stages: this result is consis-
tent with the interpretation of a higher efficiency of more educated people 
to maintain their health stock through preventive care. Higher income in-
creases the probability of private tests by more than one-third. 
 
  
36 See Fabbri and Monfardini (2003). The same results were obtained by Pohlmeier and 
Ulrich (1995) for Germany. 
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Tab. 12 – Demand for public diagnostic tests 
Contact decision Frequency of treatment 
 Coef Std Err %(a) Coef Std Err %(b) 
MALE  -0.209*** 0.026 -18.9   0.022 0.033 2.2 
AGE 0.014*** 0.001 1.4  0.003*** 0.001 0.3
LTEXP  -0.034 0.042 -3.4 -0.054 0.048 -5.2
EDUC 0.025*** 0.003 2.5   0.011** 0.004 1.1 
INSUR 0.142*** 0.041 15.3  -0.062 0.055 -6.0 
ACTDAYS 0.036*** 0.002 3.6   0.010*** 0.002 1.0 
OUTWORKDAYS 0.048*** 0.006 4.9   0.014* 0.005 1.4 
POOR_HEALTH 0.578*** 0.046 78.2   0.247*** 0.046 28.0 
DAILYDIFF -0.575*** 0.071 -43.7  -0.173* 0.073 -15.9 
PHYS_LIM   0.246*** 0.050 27.9   0.113* 0.053 11.9 
SMOKE  -0.033 0.031 -3.3  -0.026 0.040 -2.6 
EXEMPT1   0.853*** 0.040 134.7   0.150*** 0.042 16.2 
EXEMPT2   0.655*** 0.039 92.6   0.049 0.047 5.0 
TEST_EQUIP_NW  -0.004 0.003 -0.4  -0.000 0.003 -0.0 
TEST_EQUIP_NE   0.004 0.002 0.4  -0.000 0.003 -0.0 
TEST_EQUIP_SO -0.014*** 0.003 -1.4   0.019*** 0.004 1.9 
WAIT_DIATEST     -0.000 0.001 -0.0 
_cons  -2.725*** 0.643    0.378 0.747  
N 140011     13147   
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(a) percent change in odds for unit increase in X 
(b) percent change in expected count for unit increase in X 
 
 
Tab. 13 – Demand for private diagnostic tests 
Contact decision Frequency of treatment 
  Coef  Std Err  %(a)  Coef  Std Err  %(b) 
MALE  -0.528*** 0.048 -41.0   0.033 0.080 3.3 
AGE 0.007*** 0.001 0.8   0.003 0.002 0.6 
LTEXP 0.305*** 0.076 35.6 -0.123 0.162 -11.6 
EDUC 0.044*** 0.005 4.5   0.024** 0.009 2.4 
INSUR 0.470*** 0.061 60.1   0.124 0.110 13.2 
ACTDAYS 0.042*** 0.004 4.3   0.019*** 0.006 1.9 
OUTWORKDAYS 0.030*** 0.008 3.1   0.006 0.011 0.6 
POOR_HEALTH 0.349*** 0.096 41.7   0.352* 0.148 42.2 
DAILYDIFF -0.877*** 0.175 -58.4  -0.242 0.272 -21.5 
PHYS_LIM   0.172 0.105 18.7  -0.040 0.152 -3.9 
SMOKE   0.030 0.053 3.0  -0.077 0.090 -7.4 
EXEMPT1  -0.082 0.085 -7.9  -0.248 0.150 -21.9 
EXEMPT2 -0.663*** 0.102 -48.5  -0.005 0.177 -0.5 
TEST_EQUIP_NW -0.032*** 0.005 -3.1  -0.009 0.008 -0.9 
TEST_EQUIP_NE -0.013** 0.004 -1.3   0.007 0.007 0.7 
TEST_EQUIP_SO -0.017*** 0.005 -1.6   0.025** 0.009 2.6 
WAIT_DIATEST     -0.001 0.002 -0.1 
_cons  -8.616*** 1.169  0.457 2.445
N 140011  3678
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(a) percent change in odds for unit increase in X 
(b) percent change in expected count for unit increase in X 
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In these equations we introduce two additional variables to assess whether 
exemptions from co-payments may affect contact and frequency decisions. It 
is important to remember that EXEMPT1 is relative to the exemption for 
chronic illness – about 10% of the population equally distributed in the 
macroregions – while EXEMPT2 refers to the co-payment exemption mainly 
for age and low income – on average another 10 per cent of the Italian popu-
lation with a higher concentration in the Southern regions –. Our results show 
that being exempted increases both the probability (+134.7 per cent change in 
odds) and the frequency (+16.2 per cent change in expected counts) of diag-
nostic tests in public and accredited structures where the service is paid in 
full by the SSN. At the same time the exemption for age and income nega-
tively affects the use of fully charged diagnostic tests as expected. It’s hard to 
say to what extent the frequency of treatment increases because of the poor 
health status due to the chronic illness and to old age or because of free riding 
behaviour since the service is free of charge. Finally, waiting time doesn’t 
seem to affect the patient demand for diagnostic tests. 
 
 
5.3. Hospital Admissions 
 
Obviously the probability and the higher frequency of hospital admis-
sions is positively affected by a poor health status and by chronic illnesses 
(Table 14). The age effect is statistically significant and convex as emerges 
from the squared age variable introduced in the model. In fact the participa-
tion rate is hump-shaped with high values both for children up to 1 year 
olds (births) and for older people37. The level of education has a negative 
effect on the demand for hospital care: this result may be explained by the 
higher efficiency in preserving the health stock already noticed in the other 
preventive care services which reduces the need of hospitalization. The 
negative signs of income capacity and private insurance – although not sta-
tistically significant – are as expected since they seem to decrease the ten-
dency to use a public or accredited structure. At the second stage (fre-
quency decision) age and health conditions are the only significant vari-
ables but the waiting time negatively affects patients’ frequency of use only 
slightly. We recall that on average, waiting times are longer in the Northern 
and Central regions as a result of a congestion effect due to the migration of 
patients from the South. The geographical supply variables are not relevant 
at either stage of the decision-making process as the reason for migration is 
not the unavailability of hospital beds but the quality of care provided. 
  
37 This U-shaped pattern is consistent with a number of other studies (Cameron et al., 
1998, Economou et al.,  2007). 
 
138 
Tab. 14 – Demand for public hospitals 
                                   Contact decision Frequency of treatment 
   Coef  Std Err  %(a)  Coef  Std Err  %(b) 
MALE    0.071 0.043  7.4  0.231 0.141 25.9 
AGE -0.025*** 0.004 -2.5 0.030* 0.014 3.0
AGE2   0.030*** 0.005 3.1 -0.032* 0.014 -3.2
LTEXP  -0.022 0.068 -2.2  0.152 0.206 16.4 
EDUC  -0.018*** 0.005 -1.8 -0.013 0.015 -1.3 
INSUR  -0.130 0.074 -12.2  0.081 0.274 16.4 
ACTDAYS 0.056*** 0.003 5.8  0.007 0.007 -1.3 
OUTWORKDAYS 0.071*** 0.007 7.3  0.008 0.013 8.4 
POOR_HEALTH 0.850*** 0.067 134.1  0.372* 0.182 0.7 
DAILYDIFF 0.013 0.096 1.3  0.161 0.194 0.8 
PHYS_LIM 0.393*** 0.077 48.1  0.846*** 0.209 45.0 
SMOKE  -0.086 0.055 -8.3  -0.319 0.187 17.5 
BEDS_NW 0.001 0.009 -0.1  -0.012 0.028 133.1 
BEDS_NE 0.018 0.010 1.8  -0.003 0.033 -27.3 
BEDS_SO 0.009 0.007 0.9  0.008 0.022 -1.2 
WAIT_HOSPITAL    -0.006* 0.002 -0.3 
_cons   -2.918** 1.049  -20.964*** 3.135 0.8 
N   140011   4997   
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(a) percent change in odds for unit increase in X 
(b) percent change in expected count for unit increase in X 
 
 
Tab. 15 – Synoptic Table of Estimation Results  
 
Panel A. Contact Decision (first hurdle) 
 GENERIC VISITS SPECIALIST V. DIAGN. TESTS HOSPITAL 
Explanatory variables PUBLIC PRIVATE PUBLIC PRIVATE PUBLIC PRIVATE PUBLIC
MALE -  - - - -  
AGE + - + + + + Agesq + 
LTEXP -   +  +  
EDUC - - + + + + - 
INSUR  +  + + +  
ACTDAYS + + + + + + + 
OUTWORKDAYS + + + + + + + 
POOR_HEALTH + + + + + + + 
DAILYDIFF -  - - - -  
PHYS_LIM +  + + +  + 
SMOKE - -      
SUPPLY_NWEST +   -  -  
SUPPLY_NEAST + -  -  -  
SUPPLY_SOUTH - - - - - -  
EXEMPT1 (a)     +   
EXEMPT2 (a)   + -
REFERENCE INDIVIDUAL: female, without private insurance, with no physical limitations or dis-
abilities, no smoking, in good health (a) Only for diagnostic tests 
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segue tab. 15 
 
Panel B. Frequency Decision (second hurdle) 
 GENERIC VISITS SPECIALIST V. DIAGN. TESTS HOSPITAL 
Explanatory variables PUBLIC PRIVATE PUBLIC PRIVATE PUBLIC PRIVATE PUBLIC 
MALE        
AGE +    +  Agesq + 
LTEXP        
EDUC - -   + +  
INSUR -       
ACTDAYS + + + + + +  
OUTWORKDAYS   + + +   
POOR_HEALTH +  + + + + + 
DAILYDIFF   -
PHYS_LIM +  + + +  + 
SMOKE   +
SUPPLY_NWEST  +      
SUPPLY_NEAST -       
SUPPLY_SOUTH +    + +  
EXEMPT1 (a)     +   
EXEMPT2 (a)        
WAITING TIME  -     - 
REFERENCE INDIVIDUAL: female, without private insurance, with no physical limitations or dis-
abilities, no smoking, in good health (a) Only for diagnostic tests 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper investigates the determinants of the individual demand for 
health care services – generic and specialist visits, tests and check-ups, 
hospital admissions – in Italy, distinguishing between the public and private 
provision of these services. Empirical studies so far have been focussed on 
doctor’s consultations, although other healthcare services represent a sig-
nificant share of out-of-pocket household health expenditure. We intend to 
verify if there are different determinants behind the demand for pub-
lic/private healthcare services varying mainly in terms of price, waiting 
time, and the (perceived) quality of the service. 
The Italian constitutional right to health is guaranteed by free, universal, 
public provision of services but a private market has also developed over 
the years, with some differences across Regions. Indications of horizontal 
and vertical inequality result from various survey sources and policies have 
been implemented to deal almost exclusively with the first type. However 
socio-economic, individual characteristics may account for different 
healthcare utilization between social groups both in terms of the probability 
of demanding a service, of the intensity of use and of the choice of pro-
vider. If access to healthcare is significantly related to income then equity 
among socio-economic groups may be jeopardized. 
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An empirical, two-part model has been estimated on a very large dataset 
for all the health services mentioned above. This approach assumes that the 
demand for health care can be thought of as a two-stage decision process: 
one for the contact and one for the frequency decision which may be condi-
tioned by a supplier-induced demand effect and other supply factors such as 
a long waiting time for accessing the service, different quality between 
providers, a difference in the cost charged to the patient.  
Our evidence shows that, all in all, the most important determinants of 
healthcare utilization appear to be variables approximating the need for 
these services. Therefore, at a first glance, in Italy equitable health care 
utilization exists since there is a correlation between health care provision 
and indicators of need. However, a correlation with individual economic 
indicators exists for some specific services. Higher household purchasing 
capacity and the additional coverage of a private insurance are both signifi-
cant in the decision to contact a private provider for all services although 
these variables do not influence the intensity of use. Therefore we may 
conclude that having higher economic resources the patient may access the 
private health care market where out of pocket payments are needed while 
publicly provided care is not affected by economic status.  
A special role is performed by the educational level of the patient which 
shows a strong positive effect on the decision to seek care. In particular in 
the demand for diagnostic tests higher education also increases the fre-
quency of use: this result is consistent with the interpretation of a higher 
efficiency of more educated people to maintain their health stock through 
preventive care. 
Interactions between supply indicators and geographical macroareas 
have been used to proxy both the demand response and the supplier-
induced-response. Results show that there is a problem of access in South-
ern Italian regions compared to the rest of the country for all healthcare 
services except hospitals. In this last case, patients’ migration to North-
Central Italy may help to mitigate the problem.  
The intensity of health care utilization is mainly explained by the need 
variables and by age. Most of the supply variables are not relevant at this 
stage of the decision-making process showing that there is no evidence in 
our findings of a supplier-induced demand effect with the possible excep-
tion of health check-ups in the South where the presence of accredited and 
private structures is predominant with likely economic incentives for over-
treatment. Exemption from co-payments increases both the probability and 
the number of check-ups paid for by the SSN: it’s hard to distinguish be-
tween an effective necessity motivated by a chronic illness or old age and 
patient free riding behaviour since the service is free of charge. 
 
141 
To summarize, some accessibility problems seem to arise for persons 
who have fewer alternatives in the private market – with lower income, less 
educated, not privately insured – and living in the Southern part of the 
country. Therefore, past reforms of the SSN trying to equally distribute fi-
nancial resources across Regions have failed their mission at least partially. 
Some vulnerabilities – such as chronic illnesses, old age – are tackled by 
user-charge exemptions in the case of check-ups. Others are more related to 
the quality of the service provided which unfortunately could not be 
proxied by any variable in our dataset though some insights in this direction 
were provided by our descriptive analysis. In terms of policies, the funda-
mental role of education should be interpreted in a positive sense: more 
educated individuals treat their health as a valuable good and seek for more 
qualified and preventive care, intensifying the use of check-ups. Cohorts of 
individuals who will enter old age in the coming decades should be more 
efficient consumers of healthcare: this is hopefully a good outcome but it 
also implies adequate responses from the national health service to preserve 
health as a right established by the Italian Constitution.  
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Abstract 
 
Is Healthcare Demand Rationed by Income and Other Determinants? An Empirical Assess-
ment for Italy 
 
The Italian national health service was funded in 1978 with the goal of providing uniform 
and comprehensive care under the inspiration of the Republic’s Constitution. It is important 
to assess to what extent the health service meets the potential demand of the population and 
if the socio-economic status of the patient – mainly income and education – may ration the 
access to healthcare. This paper offers an empirical assessment of the determinants of 
healthcare demand in Italy for a detailed range of services including diagnostic tests and 
hospital services, not often analyzed in the empirical literature. An econometric hurdle mod-
el is applied to individual microdata from a large-scale survey. From our results, some ac-
cessibility problems seem to arise for persons who have fewer alternatives in the private 
market – with lower income, less educated, not privately insured – and living in the South-
ern part of the country. 
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